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Abstract—With substantial amount of time, resources and
human (team) efforts invested to explore and develop successful
deep neural networks (DNN), there emerges an urgent need
to protect these inventions from being illegally copied, redis-
tributed, or abused without respecting the intellectual properties
of legitimate owners. Following recent progresses along this line,
we investigate a number of watermark-based DNN ownership
verification methods in the face of ambiguity attacks, which aim
to cast doubts on the ownership verification by forging counterfeit
watermarks. It is shown that ambiguity attacks pose serious
threats to existing DNN watermarking methods. As remedies to
the above-mentioned loophole, this paper proposes novel passport-
based DNN ownership verification schemes which are both robust
to network modifications and resilient to ambiguity attacks. The
gist of embedding digital passports is to design and train DNN
models in a way such that, the DNN inference performance of
an original task will be significantly deteriorated due to forged
passports. In other words, genuine passports are not only verified
by looking for the predefined signatures, but also reasserted
by the unyielding DNN model inference performances. Extensive
experimental results justify the effectiveness of the proposed
passport-based DNN ownership verification schemes. Code and
models are available at https://github.com/kamwoh/DeepIPR
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of deep neural networks (DNN),
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has emerged as
a viable and lucrative business model. However, building a
successful DNN is not a trivial task, which usually requires
substantial investments on expertise, time and resources. As
a result of this, there is an urgent need to protect invented
DNN models from being illegally copied, redistributed or
abused (i.e. intellectual property infringement). Recently, for
instance, digital watermarking techniques have been adopted to
provide such a protection, by embedding watermarks into DNN
models during the training stage. Subsequently, ownerships of
these inventions are verified by the detection of the embedded
watermarks, which are supposed to be robust to multiple types
of modifications such as model fine-tuning, model pruning and
watermark overwriting [1], [2], [3], [4].
In terms of deep learning methods to embed watermarks,
existing approaches can be broadly categorized into two schools:
a) the feature-based methods that embed designated watermarks
into the DNN weights by imposing additional regularization
terms [1], [3], [5]; and b) the trigger-set based methods
that rely on adversarial training samples with specific labels
(i.e. backdoor trigger sets) [2], [4]. Watermarks embedded
with either of these methods have successfully demonstrated
robustness against removal attacks which involve modifications
of the DNN weights such as fine-tuning or pruning. However,
our studies disclose the existence and effectiveness of ambiguity
attacks which aim to cast doubt on the ownership verification
by forging additional watermarks for DNN models in question
(see Fig. 1). We also show that it is always possible to reverse-
engineer forged watermarks at minor computational cost where
the original training dataset is also not needed (Sect. II).
As remedies to the above-mentioned loophole, this paper
proposes a novel passport-based approach. There is a unique
advantage of the proposed passports over traditional watermarks
- i.e. the inference performance of a pre-trained DNN model
will either remain intact given the presence of valid passports,
or be significantly deteriorated due to either the modified or
forged passports. In other words, we propose to modulate
the inference performances of the DNN model depending on
the presented passports, and by doing so, one can develop
ownership verification schemes that are both robust to removal
attacks and resilient to ambiguity attacks at once (Sect. III).
The contributions of our work are threefold: i) we put forth
a general formulation of DNN ownership verification schemes
and, empirically, we show that existing DNN watermarking
methods are vulnerable to ambiguity attacks; ii) we propose
novel passport-based verification schemes and demonstrate with
extensive experiment results that these schemes successfully
defeat ambiguity attacks; iii) methodology-wise, the proposed
modulation of DNN inference performance based on the
presented passports (Eq. 5) plays an indispensable role in
bringing the DNN model behaviours under control against
adversarial attacks.
A. Related work
Uchida et. al [1] was probably the first work that proposed
to embed watermarks into DNN models by imposing an
additional regularization term on the weights parameters. [2],
[6] proposed to embed watermarks in the classification labels
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2(a) Application Scenario. (b) Present Solution. (c) Proposed Solution.
Fig. 1: DNN model ownership verification in the face of ambiguity attacks. (a): Owner Alice uses an embedding process
E to train a DNN model with watermarks (T, s) and releases the model publicly available; Attacker Bob forges counterfeit
watermarks (T′, s′) with an invert process I; (b): The ownership is in doubt since both the original and forged watermarks are
detected by the verification process V (Sect. II-B); (c): The ambiguity is resolved when our proposed passports are embedded
and the network performances are evaluated in favour of the original passport by the fidelity evaluation process F (See Definition
1 and Sect. III-D).
of adversarial examples in a trigger set, so that the watermarks
can be extracted remotely through a service API without the
need to access the network weights (i.e. black-box setting).
Also in both black-box and white box settings, [3], [5], [7]
demonstrated how to embed watermarks (or fingerprints) that
are robust to various types of attacks. In particular, it was
shown that embedded watermarks are in general robust to
removal attacks that modify network weights via fine-tuning
or pruning. Watermark overwriting, on the other hand, is
more problematic since it aims to simultaneously embed a
new watermark and destroy the existing one. Although [5]
demonstrated robustness against overwriting attack, it did not
resolve the ambiguity resulted from the counterfeit watermark.
Adi et al. [2] also discussed how to deal with an adversary who
fine-tuned an already watermarked networks with new trigger
set images. Nevertheless, [2] required the new set of images
to be distinguishable from the true trigger set images. This
requirement is however often unfulfilled in practice, and our
experiment results show that none of existing watermarking
methods are able to deal with ambiguity attacks explored in
this paper (see Sect. II).
In the context of digital image watermarking, [8], [9] have
studied ambiguity attacks that aim to create an ambiguous
situation in which a watermark is reverse-engineered from
an already watermarked image, by taking advantage of the
invertibility of forged watermarks [10]. It was argued that robust
watermarks do not necessarily imply the ability to establish
ownership, unless non-invertible watermarking schemes are
employed (see Proposition 2 for our proposed solution).
II. RETHINKING DEEP NEURAL NETWORK OWNERSHIP
VERIFICATION
This section analyses and generalizes existing DNN water-
marking methods in the face of ambiguity attacks. We must
emphasize that the analysis mainly focuses on three aspects i.e.
fidelity, robustness and invertibility of the ownership verification
schemes, and we refer readers to representative previous work
[1], [2], [3], [4] for formulations and other desired features of
the entire watermark-based intellectual property (IP) protection
schemes, which are out of the scope of this paper.
A. Reformulation of DNN ownership verification schemes
Figure 1 summarizes the application scenarios of DNN
model ownership verifications provided by the watermark based
schemes. Inspired by [10], we also illustrate an ambiguous situ-
ation in which rightful ownerships cannot be uniquely resolved
by the current watermarking schemes alone. This loophole is
largely due to an intrinsic weakness of the watermark-based
methods i.e. invertibility. Formally, the definition of DNN
model ownership verification schemes is generalized as follows.
Definition 1. A DNN model ownership verification scheme is
a tuple V = (E,F, V, I) of processes:
I) An embedding process E(Dr,T, s,N[⋅], L) =
N[W,T, s], is a DNN learning process that takes
training data Dr = {Xr,yr} as inputs, and optionally,
either trigger set data T = {XT ,yT } or signature s, and
outputs the model N[W,T, s] by minimizing a given
loss L.
Remark: the DNN architectures are pre-determined by
N[⋅] and, after the DNN weights W are learned, either
the trigger set T or signatures s will be embedded and
can be verified by the verification process defined next1.
II) A fidelity evaluation process
F (N[W, ⋅, ⋅],Dt,Mt, f) = {True, False} is to
evaluate whether or not the discrepancy is less than a pre-
defined threshold i.e. ∣M(N[W, ⋅, ⋅],Dt) −Mt∣ ≤ f ,
in which M(N[W, ⋅, ⋅],Dt) is the DNN inference
performance tested against a set of test data Dt where
Mt is the target inference performance.
Remark: it is often expected that a well-behaved embed-
ding process will not introduce a significant inference
performance change that is greater than a predefined
threshold f . Nevertheless, this fidelity condition remains
to be verified for DNN models under either removal
attacks or ambiguity attacks.
III) A verification process V (N[W, ⋅, ⋅],T, s, s) ={True, False} checks whether or not the expected sig-
nature s or trigger set T is successfully verified for a
given DNN model N[W, ⋅, ⋅].
1Learning hyper-parameters such as learning rate and the type of optimization
methods are considered irrelevant to ownership verifications, and thus they
are not included in the formulation.
3Remark: for feature-based schemes, V involves the
detection of embedded signatures s = {P,B} with a false
detection rate that is lesser than a predefined threshold
s. Specifically, the detection boils down to measure
the distances Df(fe(W,P),B) between target feature
B and features extracted by a transformation function
fe(W,P) parameterized by P.
Remark: for trigger-set based schemes, V first invokes
a DNN inference process that takes trigger set samples
Tx as inputs, and then it checks whether the prediction
f(W,XT ) produces the designated labels Ty with a
false detection rate that is lesser than a threshold s.
IV) An invert process I(N[W,T, s]) = N[W,T′, s′] exists
and constitutes a successful ambiguity attack, if
a) a set of new trigger set T′ and/or signature s′ can be
reverse-engineered for a given DNN model;
b) the forged T′, s′ can be successfully verified
with respect to the given DNN weights W i.e.
V (I(N[W,T, s]),T′, s′, s) = True;
c) the fidelity evaluation outcome
F (N[W, ⋅, ⋅],Dt,Mt, f) defined in Definition
1.II remains True.
Remark: this condition plays an indispensable role in
designing the non-invertible verification schemes to
defeat ambiguity attacks (see Sect. III-D).
V) If at least one invert process exists for a DNN verification
scheme V , then the scheme is called an invertible scheme
and denoted by VI = (E,F, V, I ≠ ∅); otherwise, the
scheme is called non-invertible and denoted by V∅ =(E,F, V,∅).
The definition as such is abstract and can be instantiated
by concrete implementations of processes and functions.
For instance, the following combined loss function (Eq. 1)
generalizes loss functions adopted by both the feature-based
and trigger-set based watermarking methods:
L = Lc(f(W,Xr),yr)+λtLc(f(W,XT ),yT )+λrR(W, s),
(1)
in which λt, λr are the relative weight hyper-parameters,
f(W,X−) are the network predictions with inputs Xr or
XT . Lc is the loss function like cross-entropy that penalizes
discrepancies between the predictions and the target labels
yr or yT . Signature s = {P,B} consists of passports P and
signature string B. The regularization terms could be either
R = Lc(σ(W,P),B) as in [1] or R =MSE(B −PW) as
in [3].
It must be noted that, for those DNN models that will
be used for classification tasks, their inference performance
M(N[W, ⋅, ⋅],Dt) = Lc(f(W,Xt),yt) tested against a
dataset Dt = {Xt,yt} is independent of either the embedded
signature s or trigger set T. It is this independence that induces
an invertible process for existing watermark-based methods as
described next.
Proposition 1 (Invertible process). For a DNN ownership
verification scheme V as in Definition 1, if the fidelity process
F () is independent of either the signature s or trigger set
T, then there always exists an invertible process I() i.e. the
scheme is invertible VI = (E,F, V, I ≠ ∅)).
Proof. for a trained network N[Wˆ,T, s] with signature s
and/or trigger set T embedded, the invert process I() can be
constructed with the following steps:
1) maintain the optimal weights Wˆ unchanged;
2) minimize the detection error (see III in Definition (1) in
the main paper):
i) forge the feature-based watermarks
s
′ = {P′,B′} by minimizing the distance{P′,B′} = argmin
P,B
Df(fe(Wˆ,P),B). Remark:
attackers have to take B′ ≠ B, and in case that the
watermark signature B is unknown, attackers may
assign random signature B′, whose the probability
of collision B′ = B is then exponentially low.
ii) forge the trigger set T ′ = {X′T ,y′T } by minimizing
the (cross-entropy) loss {X′T ,y′T } = arg min
XT ,yT
Lc(f(Wˆ,XT ),yT ) between the prediction and the
target labels.
3) fidelity evaluation is fulfilled since it is independent to
both the forged signatures and trigger set, thus remain
unchanged.
Remark: during the minimization of detection error, there is
no need of training data which is not used in step 2 at all;
Remark: during the minimization of detection error, the
computational cost is minor since the dimensionality of the
optimization parameters i.e. {P′,B′} or X′T ,y′T is order of
magnitude smaller, as compared to the number of DNN weights
Wˆ.
B. Watermark-based DNN in the face of ambiguity attacks
In this section, we investigate a number of watermark-based
DNN ownership verification methods in the face of ambiguity
attacks, which aim to cast doubts on ownership verification by
forging counterfeit watermarks.
1) Ambiguity attacks on feature-based method [1]: Herein,
we first train a DNN model embedded with watermarks as
described in [1], then we conduct the ambiguity attacks as
follows. The loss function adopted in [1] uses the following
binary cross entropy for the embedding regularizer:
ER(W ) = − T∑
j=1
(bj log(yj) + (1 − bj) log(1 − yj)), (2)
in which yj = σ(∑iXjiwi) is the extracted feature with σ(⋅)
is the sigmoid function. In order to forge watermark X for
a given signature bj , we first freeze the weights wi of the
watermarked DNN model, and minimize the loss (Eq. 2) with
respect to the new binary signatures b′j .
Fig. 2a illustrates the distributions of counterfeit watermarks
Xji together with the original watermarks, which are hardly
distinguishable from each other. In terms of the extracted
features ∑iXjiwi, their distributions are different from the
original watermarks, but it is still impossible to tell the
difference between them after thresholding for the purpose
of ownership verification. Finally, Fig. 2c illustrates that the
4Feature based method [1] Trigger-set based method [2]
CIFAR10 Real WM Det. Fake WM Det. CIFAR10 Real WM Det. Fake WM Det.
CIFAR100 64.25 (90.97) 100 (100) 100 (100) 65.20 (91.03) 25.00 (100) 27.80 (100)
Caltech-101 74.08 (90.97) 100 (100) 100 (100) 75.06 (91.03) 43.60 (100) 46.80 (100)
TABLE I: Detection of embedded watermark (in %) with two representative watermark-based DNN methods [1], [2], before
and after DNN weights fine-tuning for transfer learning tasks. Top row denotes a DNN model trained with CIFAR10 and
weights fine-tuned for CIFAR100; while bottom row denotes weight fine-tuned for Caltech-101. Accuracy outside bracket is the
transferred task, while in-bracket is the original task. WM Det. denotes the detection accuracies of real and fake watermarks.
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Fig. 2: A comparison of the distributions of watermarks and extracted features.
(a) base image Tb
(b) noise component Tn
(c) optimized XT
Fig. 3: Sample of the trigger set images used in ambiguity
attacks on trigger-set based method in Section II-B2.
distribution of Xji is not much affected by the fine-tuning
process which aims to modify the DNN weights for transfer
learning purposes (see Table I).
Following [1], we detect watermarks by comparing the
extracted binary strings w.r.t. the designated one by measuring
the successful detection rate. As summarized in Table I, all
the counterfeit watermarks of size (256-bit) are successfully
detected. We also fine-tune the DNN model by adjusting the
network weights at all layers for new classification tasks (i.e.
CIFAR100 and Caltech-101), where counterfeit watermarks
are still detectable with 100% detection rate, demonstrating
robustness against fine-tuning too.
Note that since wi are fixed, we do not need to include the
original (cross-entropy) loss measured with the training images,
which is a constant during the optimization. This simplicity
allows the forging of Xji converge very rapidly. Note that,
the overall optimization took about only 50 iterations in 50
seconds, which merely constitutes a minor fraction (2.5%) of
the training time for the original task.
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
real
fake
Fig. 4: Distribution of the real Tb and fake XT trigger set
images. It shows that the fake trigger set images are hardly
distinguishable from the real ones.
2) Ambiguity attacks on trigger-set based method [2]:
We first follow [2] to train the DNN model with trigger
set images embedded as watermarks, and then we conduct
the ambiguity attacks as follows. In order to construct the
adversarial trigger set images by minimizing the cross-entropy
loss between the predicted labels and the target labels, we adopt
a simple approach which adds trainable noise components to
randomly selected base images using the following steps:
1) Randomly select a set of N base images Tb as shown in
Fig. 3a;
2) Make random noisy patterns of the same size Tn as
trainable parameters;
3) Use the summed components XT = Tb + ηTn as the
trigger set images, in which η = 0.04 to make the noise
component invisible;
4) Randomly assign trigger set labels yT ;
5) Minimize the cross-entropy cost Lc(f(Wˆ,XT ),yT ) w.r.t.
the trainable parameter Tn.
Remark: DNN parameters Wˆ are fixed during the opti-
mization, and thus, the original training data is not needed.
Fig. 3c illustrates the final optimized XT . where all of
them are correctly classified as the assigned labels i.e. yT .
Visually, these forged trigger set images (Fig. 3c) are hardly
5(a) An example in the ResNet layer that consists of the proposed
passporting layers. pl = {plγ , plβ} is the proposed digital passports
where F = Avg(Wlp ∗Plγ,β) is a passport function to compute the
hidden parameters (i.e. γ and β) given in Eq. (3).
(b) A comparison of CIFAR10 classification accuracies given the
original DNN, proposed DNN with valid passports, proposed DNN
with randomly generated passports (fake1), and proposed DNN with
reverse-engineered passports (fake2).
Fig. 5: (a) Passport layers in ResNet architecture and (b) Classification accuracies modulated by different passports in CIFAR10,
e.g. given counterfeit passports, the DNN models performance will be deteriorated instantaneously to fend off illegal usage.
distinguishable from the original ones (Fig. 3a). In terms of
histogram distributions, they are indistinguishable too (see
Fig. 4). As shown in Table I, both the trigger set and forged
images are 100% correctly labeled with assigned adversarial
labels. This indistinguishable situation casts doubt on ownership
verification by trigger set images alone.
After fine-tuned to other classification tasks, however, the
classification accuracies of both trigger set and forged images
deteriorated drastically yet the detection rate of forged images
is slightly better than that of the original trigger set images. We
ascribed this improvement to the ambiguity attack procedures
outlined above. In terms of the computational cost, the overall
optimization requires only about 100 epochs of fake trigger
set in 100 seconds, which merely constitutes a minor fraction
(5%) of the training time for the original task.
3) Summary on ambiguity attacks on watermark-based DNN:
As proved by Proposition 1, one is able to construct forged
watermarks for any already watermarked networks. We tested
the performances of two representative DNN watermarking
methods [1], [2], and Table I shows that counterfeit watermarks
can be forged for the given DNN models with 100% detection
rate, and 100% fake trigger set images can be reconstructed as
well in the original task. Given that the detection accuracies for
the forged trigger set is slightly better than the original trigger
set after fine-tuning, the claim of the ownership is ambiguous
and cannot be resolved by neither feature-based nor trigger-set
based watermarking methods. Shockingly, the computational
cost to forge counterfeit watermarks is minor, and worst still
this is achieved without the need of original training data.
As a whole, the ambiguity attacks against DNN water-
marking methods are effective with minor computational and
without the need of original training datasets. We ascribe this
loophole to the crux that the loss of the original task i.e.
Lc(f(Wˆ,Xr),yr) is independent of the forged watermarks.
In the next section, we shall illustrate a solution to defeat the
ambiguity attacks.
III. EMBEDDING PASSPORTS FOR DNN OWNERSHIP
VERIFICATION
The main motivation of embedding digital passports is
to design and train DNN models in a way such that, their
inference performances of the original task (i.e. classification
accuracy) will be significantly deteriorated due to the forged
signatures. We shall illustrate next first how to implement the
desired property by incorporating the so called passport layers,
followed by different ownership protection schemes that exploit
the embedded passports to effectively defeat ambiguity attacks.
A. Passport layers
In order to control the DNN model functionalities by the
embedded digital signatures i.e. passports, we proposed to
append after a convolution layer a passport layer, whose scale
factor γ and bias shift term β are dependent on both the
convolution kernels Wp and the designated passport P as
follows:
O
l(Xp) = γlXlp + βl = γl(Wlp ∗Xlc) + βl, (3)
γ
l = Avg(Wlp ∗Plγ), βl = Avg(Wlp ∗Plβ), (4)
in which ∗ denotes the convolution operations, l is the layer
number, Xp is the input to the passport layer and Xc is the
input to the convolution layer. O() is the corresponding linear
transformation of outputs, while Plγ and P
l
β are the passports
used to derive scale factor and bias term respectively. Figure
5a delineates the architecture of digital passport layers used in
a ResNet layer.
Remark: for DNN models trained with passport
se = {Plγ ,Plβ}l, their inference performances
M(N[W, se],Dt, st) depend on the running time passports
st i.e.
M(N[W, se],Dt, st) = { Mse , if st = se,Mse , otherwise. (5)
If the genuine passport is not presented st ≠ se, the running
time performance Mse is significantly deteriorated because the
6(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6: Example of different types of passports: (a) random
patterns, (b) fixed image and (c) random shuffled.
corresponding scale factor γ and bias terms β are calculated
based on the wrong passports. For instance, as shown in Figure
5b, a proposed DNN model presented with valid passports
(green) will demonstrate almost identical accuracies as to the
original DNN model (red). In contrast, the same proposed
DNN model presented with counterfeit passports (blue), the
accuracy will deteriorate to merely about 10% only.
Remark: the gist of the proposed passport layer is to enforce
dependence between scale factor, bias terms and network
weights. As shown by the Proposition 2, it is this dependence
that validates the required non-invertibility to defeat ambiguity.
Proposition 2 (Non-invertible process). A DNN ownership
verification scheme V as in Definition 1 is non-invertible, if
I) the fidelity process outcome F (N[W,T, s],Dt,Mt, f)
depends either on the presented signature s or trigger set
T,
II) with forged passport st ≠ se, the DNN inference perfor-
mance M(N[W, se],Dt, st) in (Eq. 5) will deteriorate
such that the discrepancy is larger than a threshold i.e.∣Mse −Mse∣ > f .
Proof. Since using forged passports the DNN model perfor-
mance is significantly deteriorated such that ∣MPe −MPe∣ >
f , it immediately follows, from the definition of invertible
verification schemes, that the scheme in question is non-
invertible.
B. Methods to generate passports
Public parameters of a passport protected DNN might be
easily plagiarized, then the plagiarizer has to deceive the
network with certain passports. The chance of success of such
an attacking strategy depends on the odds of correctly guessing
the secret passports. Figure 6 illustrates three different types
of passports which have been investigated in our work:
a) random patterns, whose elements are independently ran-
domly generated according to the uniform distribution
between [-1, 1].
b) one selected image is fed through a trained DNN model
with the same architecture, and the corresponding feature
maps are collected. Then the selected image is used at
the input layer and the corresponding feature maps are
used at other layers as passports. We refer to passports
generated as such the fixed image passport.
c) a set of N selected images are fed to a trained DNN model
with the same architecture, and N corresponding feature
maps are collected at each layer. Among the N options,
only one is randomly selected as the passport at each
Fig. 7: Randomly shuffled passports in a 5-layered passport
AlexNetp. From left to right: Conv1 to Conv5 layers where
the 4 passports in Conv2 to Conv5 corresponding to the first
4 channel of each layer.
layer. Specifically, for a set of N images being applied
to a DNN model with L layers, there are altogether NL
possible combinations of passports that can be generated.
We refer to passports generated as such the randomly
shuffled image passports.
Since randomly shuffled passports allow strong protection
and flexibility in the passport generation and distribution, we
adopt this passport generation method for all the experiments
reported in this paper. Specifically, 20 images are selected and
fed to the DNN architectures that are used in our experiments.
Passports at those corresponding convolution layers are then
collected as possible passports. Some example of the features
maps selected as the passports at different layers are illustrated
in Figure 7.
C. Sign of scale factors as signature
During learning the DNN, to further protect the DNN models
ownership from insider threat (e.g. a former staff who establish
a new start-up business with all the resources stolen from
originator), one can enforce the scale factor γ to take either
positive or negative signs (+/-) as designated, so that it will
form a unique signature string (like fingerprint). This process
is done by adding the following sign loss regularization term
into the combined loss (Eq. 1):
R(γ,P,B) = C∑
i=1
max(γ0 − γibi, 0) (6)
in which B = {b1,⋯, bC} ∈ {−1, 1}C consists of the
designated binary bits for C convolution kernels, and γ0 is
a positive control parameter (0.1 by default unless stated
otherwise) to encourage the scale factors have magnitudes
greater than γ0.
It must be highlighted that the inclusion of sign loss (Eq.
6) enforces the scale factors γ to take either positive or
negative values, and the signs enforced in this way remain
rather persistent against various adversarial attacks. This feature
explains the superior robustness of embedded passports against
ambiguity attacks by reverse-engineering shown in Sect. IV-D.
D. Ownership verification with passports
Taking advantages of the proposed passport embedding
method, we design three ownership verification schemes that
are summarized in Fig. 8. We briefly introduce them next and
their respective merits and demerits, in terms of computational
complexity, ease to use and protection strengths etc. are
summarized in Table II. Note that, in order to enhance the
7(a) V1 (b) V2 (c) V3
Fig. 8: A graphical comparison of three different ownership verification schemes V with passports.
Algorithm 1 Forward pass of a passport layer using scheme
V1
1: procedure FORWARD V1(Xc, Wp, Pγ , Pβ)
2: γ ← Avg(Wp ∗ Pγ)
3: β ← Avg(Wp ∗ Pβ)
4: Xp ←Wp ∗Xc
5: Yp ← γ ∗O(Xp) + β ▷ O is a linear transformation
such as BatchNorm
6: return Yp
justification of ownership, one can furthermore select either
personal identification pictures or corporate logos (Figure 6c)
during the designing of the fixed or random image passports.
Also, it must be noted that, using passports as proofs of
ownership to stop infringements is the last resort, only if
the hidden parameters are illegally disclosed or (partially)
recovered. We believe this juridical protection is often not
necessary since the proposed technological solution actually
provides proactive, rather than reactive, IP protection of deep
neural networks.
V1: Passport is distributed with the trained DNN model
Hereby, the learning process aims to minimize the combined
loss function (Eq. 1), in which λt = 0 since trigger set images
are not used in this scheme and the sign loss (Eq. 6) is added
as the regularization term. The trained DNN model together
with the passport are then distributed to legitimate users, who
perform network inferences with the given passport fed to the
passport layers as shown in Figure 5a. The network ownership
is automatically verified by the distributed passports. As shown
by Table VI and Figure 11, this ownership verification is
robust to DNN model modifications. Also, as shown in Figure
5, ambiguity attacks are not able to forge a set of passport and
signature that can maintain the DNN inference performance.
The downside of this scheme is the requirement to use pass-
ports during inferencing, which leads to extra computational
cost by about 10% (see Sect. IV-F). Also the distribution of
passports to the end-users is intrusive and imposes additional
responsibility of guarding the passports safely.
V2: Private passport is embedded but not distributed
Herein, the learning process aims to simultaneously achieve
two goals, of which the first is to minimize the original
task loss (e.g. classification accuracy discrepancy) when no
Algorithm 2 Training step for scheme V1
1: initialize a passport model Ms with desired number of
passport layers, Npass
2: initialize passport keys P in Ms
3: encode desired signature s into binary to be embedded
into signs of γp of all passport layers
4: for number of training iterations do
5: sample minibatch of m samples X {X(1), ⋯, X(m)}
and targets Y {Y (1), ⋯, Y (m)}
6: if enable backdoor then
7: sample t samples of T and backdoor targets YT ▷
t = 2, default by [2]
8: concatenate X with T , Y with YT
9: compute cross-entropy loss Lc using X and Y
10: for l in Npass do
11: compute sign loss Rl using sl and γlp
12: R ← ∑Npassl Rl
13: compute combined loss L using Lc and R
14: backpropagate using L and update Mp
passport layers included; and the second is to minimize the
combined loss function (Eq. 1) with passports regularization
included. Algorithm-wise, this multi-task learning is achieved
by alternating between the minimization of these two goals.
The successfully trained DNN model is then distributed to end-
users, who may perform network inference without the need
of passports. Note that this is possible since passport layers
are not included in the distributed networks. The ownership
verification will be carried out only upon requested by the
law enforcement, by adding the passport layers to the network
in question and detecting the embedded sign signatures with
unyielding the original network inference performances.
Compared with scheme V1, this scheme is easy to use for end-
users since no passport is needed and no extra computational
cost is incurred. In the meantime, this ownership verification
is robust to removal attacks as well as ambiguity attacks. The
downside, however, is the requirement to access the DNN
weights and to append the passport layers for ownership
verification, i.e. the disadvantages of white-box protection mode
as discussed in [2]. Therefore, we propose to combine it with
trigger-set based verification that will be described next.
V3: Both the private passport and trigger set are
8Passport
used
Trigger set
used for
verification
Weights
needed for
verification
Multi-task
Learning E M for F V
V1 { Yes , inf. ,Yes , verif. No Yes No N[W, se] { Mse , if st = se,Mse , otherwise. V (N[W, se])
V2 { No , inf. ,Yes , verif. No Yes Yes { N[W], inf. ,N[W, se], verif. ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Mse , inf. ,Mse , if st = se,
Mse , otherwise.
{ Not needed , inf. ,
V (N[W, se]), verif.
V3 { No , inf. ,Yes , verif. Yes { No , verif.T ,Yes , verif.P Yes { N[W], inf. ,N[W,T, se], verif. ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Mse , inf. ,Mse , if st = se,
Mse , otherwise.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Not needed, inf. ,
V (N[W,Te]), verif.T
V (N[W, se]), verif.P
TABLE II: A comparison of the features of the three passport-based ownership verification schemes depicted in Section III-D.
See Definition (1) for process E,F, V and Eq. (5) for the proposed DNN model performances M . Notations: "inf." is network
inference; "verif" is ownership verification; "verif.P" is verification by passport (white-box); "verif.T" is by trigger set samples
(black-box).
Algorithm 3 Forward pass of a passport layer using scheme
V2 and V3
1: procedure FORWARD V23(Xc, Wp, Pγ , Pβ , γpubl βpubl,
idx)
2: if idx = 0 then
3: Xp ←Wp ∗Xc
4: Yp ← γpubl ∗O(Xp)+ βpubl ▷ γpubl and βpubl is
a public parameter
5: return Yp
6: else
7: return FORWARD V1(Xc, Wp, Pγ , Pβ)
Algorithm 4 Sign Loss
1: procedure SIGN LOSS(Bl, W lp, P
l
γ , γ0)
2: γ
l ← Avg(W ∗p P lγ)
3: loss ← max(γ0 − γl ∗Bl, 0) ▷ γ0 is a positive
constant, equals 0.1 as by default
4: return loss
embedded but not distributed
This scheme only differs from scheme V2 in that, a set
of trigger images is embedded in addition to the embedded
passports. The advantage of this, as discussed in [2] is to
probe and claim ownership of the suspect DNN model through
remote calls of service APIs. This capability allows one, first
to claim the ownership in a black-box mode, followed by
reassertion of ownership with passport verification in a white
box mode. Algorithm-wise, the embedding of trigger set images
is jointly achieved in the same minimization process that
embeds passports in scheme V2. Finally, it must be noted
that the embedding of passports in both V2 and V3 schemes
are implemented through multi-task learning tasks where we
adopted group normalisation [11] instead of batch normalisation
[12] that is not applicable due to its dependency on running
average of batch-wise training samples.
1) Algorithms: Pseudo-code of the three verification
schemes are illustrated in this section. For reproducibility of
this work, we will make publicly available all source codes as
well as the training / test datasets that are used in this paper,
together with the camera-ready of the submission should the
manuscript be accepted.
Using Algorithm 5, we can extract a binarized version of
Algorithm 5 Signature detection
1: procedure SIGNATURE DETECTION(Wp, Pγ)
2: γ ← Avg(Wp ∗ Pγ)
3: signature ← sign(γ)
4: convert signature into binary
5: decode binarized signature into desired format e.g. ascii
6: match decoded signature with target signature
signature s where positive γ is 1 and negative γ is 0 from
model Mp. We can then decode s into desired format such as
ASCII code. Finally, we can claim ownership of the model
Mp.
2) Multi-task learning with private passports and/or trigger
set images: The multi-task learning algorithms used for
embedding passports in schemes V2 and V3 are summarized
in Algorithm 6 which is similar to Algorithm 2.
It must be noted that the practical choice of formula (Eq. 3)
is inspired by the well-known Batch Normalization (BN) layer
which essentially applies the channel-wise linear transformation
to the inputs2. Nevertheless BN is not applicable to multi-task
learning tasks because of its dependency on running average of
batch-wise training samples. When BN is used for multi-task
learning, the test accuracy is significantly reduced even though
the training accuracy seems optimized. We therefore adopted
group normalization (GN) in the baseline DNN model for
schemes V2 and V3 reported in Table VI3.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
This section illustrates the empirical study of passport-based
DNN models, with focuses on convergence and effectiveness
of passport layers. Whereas the inference performances of
various schemes are also compared in terms of robustness
to both removal attacks and ambiguity attacks. The network
architectures we investigated include the well-known AlexNet
and ResNet-18 and in order to avoid confusion to the original
AlexNet and ResNet models, we denote AlexNetp and ResNetp-
18 as our proposed passport-based DNN models. Table III-IV
show the detailed architecture and hyper-parameters for both
2Sergey Ioffe, Christian Szegedy, “Batch Normalization: Accelerating Deep
Network Training by Reducing Internal Covariate Shift”, ICML2015, pp.
448-456.
3Yuxin Wu, Kaiming He, “Group Normalization”, ECCV2018, pp. 3-19.
9Algorithm 6 Training step for scheme V2 and V3
1: initialize a passport model Ms with desired number of
passport layers, Npass
2: if enable trigger set then ▷ for scheme V3
3: initialize trigger sets T
4: initialize passport keys P in Ms using T
5: else
6: initialize passport keys P in Ms
7: encode desired signature s into binary to be embedded
into signs of γp of all passport layers
8: for number of training iterations do
9: sample minibatch of m samples X {X(1), ⋯, X(m)}
and targets Y {Y (1), ⋯, Y (m)}
10: if enable backdoor then
11: sample t samples of T and backdoor targets YT ▷
t = 2, default by [2]
12: concatenate X with T , Y with YT
13: for idx in 0 1 do
14: if idx = 0 then
15: compute cross-entropy loss Lc using X , Y and
γpubl
16: else
17: compute cross-entropy loss Lc using X and Y
18: for l in Npass do
19: compute sign loss Rl using sl and γlp
20: R ← ∑Npassl Rl
21: compute combined loss L using Lc and R
22: backpropagate using L and update Mp
AlexNetp and ResNetp-18 that employed in all the experiments,
unless stated wise. Two publicly datasets - CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100 classification tasks are employed because these
medium-sized public datasets allow us to perform extensive
tests of the DNN model performances. Unless stated otherwise,
all experiments are repeated 5 times and tested against 50 fake
passports to get the mean inference performance.
A. Convergence
The introduction of the proposed passport layers does not
hinder the convergence of DNN learning process. As shown
in Figure 9, we observe that the test accuracies converge in
synchronization with the network weights, and computed linear
transformation parameters γ and β which all stagnate in the
later learning phase when the learning rate is reduced from
0.01 to 0.0001.
B. Effectiveness
With the introduction of the passport layers, we essentially
separate the DNN parameters into two types: the public
convolution layer parameters W and the hidden4 passport layer
- i.e. scale factor γ and bias terms β (see Eq. (5)). The learning
of each of these parameter types are different too. On one
4In this work, traditional hidden layer parameters are considered as public
parameters.
hand, the distribution of the convolution layer weights seems
identical to that of the original DNN without passport layers
(Figure 10a). However, we must emphasize that information
about the passports are embedded into weights W in the sense
that following constraints are enforced once the learning is
done:
Avg(Wlp ∗Plγ) = clγ , Avg(Wlp ∗Plβ) = clβ , (7)
where clγ , c
l
β are two constants of converged parameters γ
l
, β
l.
On the other hand, the distribution of the hidden parameters
are affected by the adoption of sign loss (Eq. 6). Clearly the
scale factors are enforced to take either positive or negative
values far from zero (Figure 10b). We also observe that the
sign of scale factors remain rather persistent against various
adversarial attacks. An additional benefit of enforcing non-zero
magnitudes of scale factors is to ensure the non-zero channel
outputs and slightly improve the performances. Correspondingly
the distribution of bias terms becomes more balanced with the
sign loss regularization (Eq. 6) included, whereas the original
bias terms are mainly negative valued (Figure 10c).
C. Robustness against removal attacks
1) Fine-tuning: In this experiment, we repeatedly trained
each model five times with designated scale factor signs
embedded into both AlexNetp and ResNetp-18 networks. Table
VI shows that the passport signatures are detected at near to
100% accuracy for all the ownership verification schemes in
the original task. Even after fine-tuning the proposed DNN
models for a new task (e.g. from CIFAR10 to Caltech-101),
almost 100% detection rates of the embedded passport are still
maintained. Note that a detected signature is claimed only iff
all the binary bits are exactly matched. We ascribe this superior
robustness to the unique controlling nature of the scale factors
— in case that a scale factor value is reduced near to zero, the
channel output will be virtually zero, thus, its gradient will
vanish and lose momentum to move towards to the opposite
value. Empirically we have not observed counter-examples
against this explanation5.
Table V shows the trigger set image detection rate before
and after fine-tuning. Note that passports are not used in this
experiment, therefore, the detection rate of the trigger set labels
deteriorated drastically after fine-tuning. Nevertheless, trigger
set images can still be used in scheme V3 to complement the
white-box passport-based verification approach.
2) Model pruning: The aim of model pruning is to reduce
redundant parameters without compromise the performance.
Here, we adopt the class-blind pruning scheme in [14], and
test our proposed DNN models with different pruning rates.
Figure 11 shows that, in general, our proposed DNN models
still maintained near to 100% accuracy even 60% parameters
are pruned, while the accuracy of testing data drops around
5%-25%. Even if we prune 90% parameters, the accuracy
of our proposed DNN models are still much higher than the
accuracy of testing data. As said, we ascribe the robustness
5A rigorous proof of this argument is under investigation and will be reported
elsewhere.
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layer name output size weight shape padding
Conv1 32 × 32 64 × 3 × 5 × 5 2
MaxPool2d 16 × 16 2 × 2
Conv2 16 × 16 192 × 64 × 5 × 5 2
Maxpool2d 8 × 8 2 × 2
Conv3 8 × 8 384 × 192 × 3 × 3 1
Conv4 8 × 8 256 × 384 × 3 × 3 1
Conv5 8 × 8 256 × 256 × 3 × 3 1
MaxPool2d 4 × 4 2 × 2
Linear 10 10 × 4096
layer name output size weight shape padding
Conv1 32 × 32 64 × 3 × 3 × 3 1
Conv2_x 32 × 32 [64 × 64 × 3 × 3
64 × 64 × 3 × 3] × 2 1
Conv3_x 16 × 16 [128 × 128 × 3 × 3
128 × 128 × 3 × 3] × 2 1
Conv4_x 8 × 8 [256 × 256 × 3 × 3
256 × 256 × 3 × 3] × 2 1
Conv5_x 4 × 4 [512 × 512 × 3 × 3
512 × 512 × 3 × 3] × 2 1
Average pool 1 × 1 4 × 4
Linear 10 10 × 512
TABLE III: (Left:) AlexNetp architecture. (Right): ResNetp-18 architecture
Hyper-parameter AlexNetp ResNetp-18
Activation function ReLU ReLU
Optimization method SGD SGD
Momentum 0.9 0.9
Learning rate 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001† 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001†
Batch size 64 64
Epochs 200 200
Learning rate decay 0.001 at epoch 100 and 0.0001 at epoch 150 0.001 at epoch 100 and 0.0001 at epoch 150
Weight Initialization [13] [13]
Passport Layers Conv3,4,5 Conv5_x
TABLE IV: Training parameters for AlexNetp and ResNetp-18, respectively († the learning rate is scheduled as 0.01, 0.001
and 0.0001 between epochs [1-100], [101-150] and [151-200] respectively).
Trigger Set Detection To CIFAR10 To CIFAR100 To Caltech-101
AlexNet CIFAR10 100% - 24.67% 57.67%
AlexNet CIFAR100 100% 36.00% - 78.67%
ResNet CIFAR10 100% - 12.50% 13.67%
ResNet CIFAR100 100% 6.33% - 4.67%
TABLE V: Detection rate of the trigger set images (before and after fine-tuning) used in scheme V3 to complement passport-based
verifications.
0 50 100 150 200
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Baseline (BN) (91.12%)
Scheme 1 (BN) (90.88%)
(a) Test accuracies
0 50 100 150 200
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
(b) Weights update
0 50 100 150 200
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
(c) Scale factors
0 50 100 150 200
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
(d) Bias terms
Fig. 9: (a) Convergences of test accuracies, (b) weight updates, (c) scale factors, and (d) bias terms of first 10 channels in
Conv4 of AlexNetp. x-axis: training epochs; y-axis: see captions of subfigures.
against model pruning to the superior persistence of signatures
embedded in the scale factor signs (see Sect. III-C).
D. Resilience against ambiguity attacks
As shown in Fig. 12, the accuracy of our proposed DNN
models trained on CIFAR10/100 classification task is signifi-
cantly depending on the presence of either valid or counterfeit
passports — the proposed DNN models presented with valid
passports demonstrated almost identical accuracies as to the
original DNN model. Contrary, the same proposed DNN model
presented with invalid passports (in this case of fake1 =
random attack) achieved only 10% accuracy which is merely
equivalent to a random guessing. In the case of fake2, we
assume that the adversaries have access to the original training
dataset, and attempt to reverse-engineer the scale factor and
bias term by freezing the trained DNN weights. It is shown that
in Fig. 12, reverse-engineering attacks are only able to achieve,
for CIFAR10, at best 84% accuracy on AlexNetp and 70%
accuracy on ResNetp-18. While in CIFAR100, for fake1 case,
attack on both our proposed DNN models achieved only 1%
accuracy; for fake2 case, this attack only able to achieve 44%
accuracy for AlexNetp and 35% accuracy for ResNetp-18.
1) Random attacks: The following experiments aim to
disclose the dependence of the original task performances with
11
−0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
0
5
10
15
20
25 originalpassport
(a) Weight distribution
−0.50−0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75
0
2
4
6
8
10
12 original
passport
(b) Scale factor distribution
−0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
0
2
4
6
8
10
original
passport
(c) Bias term distribution
Fig. 10: Comparison of the distributions of (a) network weights, (b) scale factors, and (c) bias terms between the original and
passport DNN (Conv4 of AlexNetp)
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Fig. 11: Removal Attack (Model Pruning): Classification
accuracy of our passport-based DNN models on both CI-
FAR10/CIFAR100 and signature detection accuracy against
different pruning rates.
respect to the crucial parameter scale factors, and specifically,
its positive/negative signs.
In the first experiment, for the passport-embedded DNN
models, we simulate random attacks by flipping the signs
of certain randomly selected scale factors and then measure
the performance. It turns out that the final performance are
sensitive to the change of signs — majority of the DNN model
performances drop significantly as long as more than (at least)
50% of scale factors have flipped signs as shown in Figure 13
and Figure 14, respectively. The deteriorated performances are
more pronounced when the passports are embedded in either
all the three convolution layers (3-4-5) in AlexNetp (right-
most column in Figure 13) or the last blocks in ResNetp-18
(Figure 14), whose performances drop to about 10% and 1%
respectively.
The simulation results summarized in Figure 13 and Figure
14 are in accordance to the results illustrates in Figure 12, which
shows that the performance of passport-embedded DNNs under
the attack of randomly assigned passport signatures. The poor
performances measured for both AlexNetp and ResNetp-18
on CIFAR10/CIFAR100 tasks are in the range of [10%, 30%]
and [1%, 3%] respectively.
2) Reversed-engineering attacks: In this experiment, we
further assume the adversaries have the access to original
training data and thus are able to maximize the original
CIFAR10
AlexNetp CIFAR10 CIFAR100 Caltech-101
Baseline (BN) - (91.12) - (65.53) - (76.33)
Scheme V1 100 (90.91) 100 (64.64) 100 (73.03)
Baseline (GN) - (90.88) - (62.17) - (73.28)
Scheme V2 100 (89.44) 99.91 (59.31) 100 (70.87)
Scheme V3 100 (89.15) 99.96 (59.41) 100 (71.37)
ResNetp-18
Baseline (BN) - (94.85) - (72.62) - (78.98)
Scheme V1 100 (94.62) 100 (69.63) 100 (72.13)
Baseline (GN) - (93.65) - (69.40) - (75.08)
Scheme V2 100 (93.41) 100 (63.84) 100 (71.07)
Scheme V3 100 (93.26) 99.98 (63.61) 99.99 (72.00)
CIFAR100
AlexNetp CIFAR100 CIFAR10 Caltech-101
Baseline (BN) - (68.26) - (89.46) - (79.66)
Scheme V1 100 (68.31) 100 (89.07) 100 (78.83)
Baseline (GN) - (65.09) - (88.30) - (78.08)
Scheme V2 100 (64.09) 100 (87.47) 100 (76.31)
Scheme V3 100 (63.67) 100 (87.46) 100 (75.89)
ResNetp-18
Baseline (BN) - (76.25) - (93.22) - (82.88)
Scheme V1 100 (75.52) 100 (95.28) 99.99 (79.27)
Baseline (GN) - (72.06) - (91.83) - (79.15)
Scheme V2 100 (72.15) 100 (90.94) 100 (77.34)
Scheme V3 100 (72.10) 100 (91.30) 100 (77.46)
TABLE VI: Removal Attack (Fine-tuning): Detec-
tion/Classification accuracy (in %) of different passport
networks where BN = batch normalisation and GN = group
normalisation. (Left: trained with CIFAR10 and fine-tune
for CIFAR100/Caltech-101. Right: trained with CIFAR100
and fine-tune for CIFAR10/Caltech-101.) Accuracy outside
bracket is the signature detection rate, while in-bracket is the
classification rate.
task performance by reverse-engineering scale factors (i.e.
flipping the sign (+/-) of the scale factor). The trained
AlexNetp/ResNetp-18 are used for this experiment, and it
turns out the best performance the adversary can achieve is no
more than 84%/70% for CIFAR10 and 40%/38% for CIFAR100
classifications respectively (see Figure 15).
Summary Extensive empirical studies show that it is
impossible for adversaries to maintain the original DNN model
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Ambiguity attack
modes
Attackers have
access to
Ambiguous passport
construction methods
Invertibility
(see Def. 1.V)
Verification scheme
V1
Verification scheme
V2
Verification scheme
V3
fake1 W - Random passport Pr - F (Pr) fail, by large margin Large accuracy ↓ Large accuracy ↓ Large accuracy ↓
fake2 W , {Dr ;Dt} - Reverse engineer passport Pe - F (Pe) fail, by moderate margin Moderate accuracy ↓ Moderate accuracy ↓ Moderate accuracy ↓
fake3
W , {Dr ;Dt},
{P , S}
- Reverse engineer passport {Pe;Se}
by exploiting original passport P
& sign string S
- if Se = S:
F (Pe) pass, with negligible margin
- if Se ≠ S:
F (Pe) fail, by moderate to huge margin see Figure 16 see Figure 16 see Figure 16
TABLE VII: Summary of overall passport network performances in Scheme V1, V2 and V3, respectively under three different
ambiguity attack modes, fake.
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(a) AlexNetp. (Left) CIFAR10,
(Right) CIFAR100.
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(b) ResNetp-18. (Left) CIFAR10,
(Right) CIFAR100.
Fig. 12: Ambiguity Attack: Classification accuracy of our
passport networks with valid passport, random attack (fake1)
and reversed-engineering attack (fake2) on CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100. Note that, the accuracies of our passport networks
with valid passports and original DNN (without passport) are
too close to separate in histograms.
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Fig. 13: Ambiguity Attack (Random): It can be seen that the
performance of AlexNetp deteriorates with randomly flipped
scale factor signs. Left to right: flip one layer, two layers and
three layers, respectively. Top row is CIFAR10 and bottom
row is CIFAR100 dataset.
performances by using fake passports, regardless of the fake
passports are either randomly generated or reverse-engineered
with the use of original training datasets. Table VII summarize
the accuracy of the proposed methods under ambiguity attack
modes, fake depending on attackers’ knowledge of the
protection mechanism. It shows that all the corresponding
passport-based DNN models accuracies are deteriorated to
various extents. The ambiguous attacks are therefore defeated
according to the fidelity evaluation process, F (). We’d like
to highlight that even under the most adversary condition, i.e.
(a) CIFAR10
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Fig. 14: ResNetp-18: It can be seen that the performance
deteriorates with randomly flipped scale factor signs. Left to
right: Scheme V1, V2 and V3, respectively.
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(a) CIFAR10 (top: AlexNetp; bot-
tom: ResNetp-18)
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(b) CIFAR100 (top: AlexNetp;
bottom: ResNetp-18)
Fig. 15: Performance of (a) CIFAR10 and (b) CIFAR100 when
adversaries try to forge a new signature by a certain % of
dissimilarity with the original signature.
freezing weights, maximizing the distance from the original
passport P , and minimizing the accuracy loss (in layman
terms, it means both the original passports and scale signs
are exploited due to insider threat, and we class this as fake3),
attackers are still unable to use new (modified) scale signs
without compromising the network accuracies. As shown in Fig.
16, with 10% and 50% of the original scale signs are modified,
the CIFAR100 classification accuracy drops about 5% and
50%, respectively. In case that the original scale sign remains
unchanged, the DNN model ownership can be easily verified
by the pre-defined string of signs. Also, Table VII shows that
attackers are unable to exploit Dt to forge ambiguous passports.
Based on these empirical studies, we decide to set the
threshold f in Definition 1 as 3% for AlexNetp and 20% for
13
0 25 50 75 100
Dissimilarity between valid and fake signature (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
C
la
s
s
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
(%
)
Fake Passport
Valid Passport
(a) V1
0 25 50 75 100
Dissimilarity between valid and fake signature (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
C
la
s
s
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
(%
)
Fake Passport
Valid Passport
(b) V2
0 25 50 75 100
Dissimilarity between valid and fake signature (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
C
la
s
s
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
(%
)
Fake Passport
Valid Passport
(c) V3
Fig. 16: Ambiguity Attack: Classification accuracy on CI-
FAR100 under insider threat (fake3) on three verification
schemes. It is shown that when a correct signature is used,
the classification accuracy is intact, while for a partial correct
signature (sign scales are modified around 10%), the perfor-
mance will immediately drop around 5%, and a totally wrong
signature will obtain a meaningless accuracy (1-10%). Based
on the threshold ≤ f = 3% for AlexNetp and by the fidelity
evaluation process F , any potential ambiguity attacks (even
with partially correct signature) are effectively defeated.
Learned Parameters Signature s
Scale factor γ sign (+/-) ASCII code Character
-0.1113 -1
116 t
0.2344 1
0.2494 1
0.4885 1
-0.1021 -1
0.3889 1
-0.1225 -1
-0.3401 -1
-0.1705 -1
104 h
0.3338 1
0.1884 1
-0.1215 -1
0.1620 1
-0.1754 -1
-0.2698 -1
-0.1958 -1
-0.1007 -1
105 i
0.3923 1
0.4288 1
-0.1125 -1
0.4355 1
-0.1524 -1
-0.1073 -1
0.1922 1
-0.1999 -1
115 s
0.2710 1
0.1599 1
0.2496 1
-0.1345 -1
-0.1907 -1
0.2326 1
0.1967 1
Learned Parameters Signature s
Scale factor γ sign (+/-) ASCII code Character
-0.1657 -1
105 i
0.1665 1
0.4633 1
-0.2668 -1
0.3830 1
-0.1789 -1
-0.1077 -1
0.1585 1
-0.2257 -1
115 s
0.2916 1
0.2169 1
0.1862 1
-0.1146 -1
-0.1512 -1
0.2288 1
0.3064 1
TABLE VIII: Sample of the learned scale factor γ and
respective signs (+/-) from the 48 out of 256 channels from
Conv5 of AlexNetp when we embed signature s = {this} and
{is}.
ResNetp-18, respectively. By this fidelity evaluation process,
any potential ambiguity attacks are effectively defeated. In
summary, extensive empirical studies have shown that it is
impossible for adversaries to maintain the original DNN model
accuracies by using counterfeit passports, regardless of they
are either randomly generated or reverse-engineered with the
use of original training datasets. This passport dependent
performances play an indispensable role in designing secure
ownership verification schemes that are illustrated in Sect.
III-D.
E. Sign of scale factors as signature
In this section, we show how the sign (+/-) of scale
factor γ can be used to encode a signature s such as ASCII
code. Table VIII shows an example of the learned scale
factors and its respective sign when we embed a signature
Signature s Accuracy (%)
AlexNet (baseline) - 91.12
this is an example signature 90.89
AlexNetp thhs iB an xxxpxX∣ sigjature 82.83
qpCA2J
O
Ec∆o ∗ 1ay 11.44
TABLE IX: A comparison of the accuracy of AlexNet(s) in
CIFAR10 classification task when a correct (top), partially
correct (middle) or totally wrong (bottom) signature is used.
s = {this is an example signature} into the Conv5 of
AlexNetp by using sign loss (Eq. 6). Note that the maximum
size of an embedded signature is depending on the number of
the channels in a DNN model. For instance, in this paper, the
Conv5 of AlexNetp as shown in Table III has 256 channels, so
the maximum signature capacity can be embedded is 256bits.
For ownership verification, the embedded signature s can
be revealed by decoding the learned sign of scale factors. For
example, in Table VIII, every 8bits of the scale factor sign is
decoded into ASCII code as follow:
1. {-1,1,1,1,-1,1,-1,-1} → 116 → t
2. {-1,1,1,-1,1,-1,-1,-1} → 104 → h
3. {-1,1,1,-1,1,-1,-1,-1} → 105 → i
4. {-1,1,1,1,-1,-1,1,1} → 115 → s
5. {-1,1,1,-1,1,-1,-1,1} → 105 → i
6. {-1,1,1,1,-1,-1,1,1} → 115 → s
Note that, in this proposed method, similar character (e.g.
{i} and {s}) appears in different position of a string will have
different scale factors. Table IX shows a comparison result
when a correct signature, partial correct signature or total
wrong signature is used in CIFAR10 classification task with
AlexNetp. It is shown that when a correct signature is used (i.e
this is an example signature), the classification accuracy reached
90.89%, while for a partial correct signature, the performance
is dropped to 82.23%, and a totally wrong signature will obtain
a meaningless accuracy (11.44%). Based on the threshold f
= 3% for AlexNetp and by the fidelity evaluation process,
any potential ambiguity attacks (even with partially correct
signature) are effectively defeated.
F. Network Complexity
Table X shows the training and inference time of each
scheme on AlexNetp and ResNetp-18, respectively using one
NVIDIA Titan V. In both of the proposed DNN architectures,
the inference time of the baseline, scheme V2, scheme V3
are almost the same as to the execution time because all
of them didn’t use passport to calculate γ and β. However,
scheme V1 is slightly slower (about 10%) compared to the
baseline because of the extra computational cost of γ and β
calculation from the passport. Training time of scheme V1,
scheme V2 and scheme V3 are slower than the baseline about
18%(ResNetp-18)/27%(AlexNetp), 116%(ResNetp-18)/125%
and 127%(ResNetp-18)/153%, respectively. Scheme V2 and
scheme V3 are slower about 2x than scheme V1 due to the
multi task training scheme. Nonetheless, we tested a larger
network (i.e. ResNetp-50) and its training time increases 10%,
182% and 191% respectively for V1, V2 and V3 schemes. This
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CIFAR10
T I
AlexNet (Baseline) 8.445 0.834
AlexNetp V1 10.745 0.912
AlexNetp V2 19.010 0.830
AlexNetp V3 21.372 0.881
CIFAR10
T I
ResNet (Baseline) 31.09 1.71
ResNetp-18 V1 36.67 1.94
ResNetp-18 V2 67.21 1.87
ResNetp-18 V3 70.69 1.88
TABLE X: Training (T) and Inference (I) time of each scheme on AlexNetp (left) and ResNetp-18 (right) using one NVIDIA
Titan V. The values are in seconds/epoch.
Scheme V1 Scheme V2 Scheme V3
Training
- Passport layers added
- Passports needed
- 15%-30% more training time
- Passport layers added
- Passports needed
- 100%-125% more training time
- Passport layers added
- Passports & Trigger set needed
- 100%-150% more training time
Inferencing
- Passport layers & Passports needed
- 10% more inferencing time
- Passport layers & Passport NOT needed
- NO extra time incurred
- Passport layers & Passport NOT needed
- NO extra time incurred
Verification - NO separate verification needed - Passport layers & Passports needed
- Trigger set needed (black-box verification)
- Passport layers & Passports needed (white-box verification)
TABLE XI: Summary of our proposed passport networks complexity for V1, V2 and V3 schemes.
increase is consistent with those smaller models i.e. AlexNetp
and ResNetp-18.
Table XI summarizes the complexity of passport networks
in various schemes. We believe that it is the computational
cost at the inference stage that is required to be minimized,
since network inference is going to be performed frequently by
the end users. While extra costs at the training and verification
stages, on the other hand, are not prohibitive since they are
performed by the network owners, with the motivation to
protect the DNN model ownerships.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Considering billions of dollars have been invested by giant
and start-up companies to explore new DNN models virtually
every second, we believe it is imperative to protect these
inventions from being stolen. While ownership of DNN models
might be resolved by registering the models with a centralized
authority, it has been recognized that these regulations are
inadequate and technical solutions are urgently needed to
support the law enforcement and juridical protections. It is
this motivation that highlights the unique contribution of the
proposed method in unambiguous verification of DNN models
ownerships.
Methodology-wise, our empirical studies re-asserted that
over-parameterized DNN models can successfully learn mul-
tiple tasks with arbitrarily assigned labels and/or constraints.
While this assertion has been theoretically proved [15] and
empirically investigated from the perspective of network
generalization [16], its implications to network security in
general remain to be explored. We believe the proposed
modulation of DNN performance based on the presented
passports will play an indispensable role in bringing DNN
behaviours under control against adversarial attacks, as it has
been demonstrated for DNN ownership verifications.
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